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ABSTRACT 
 
The National Australia Bank (NAB) is the largest financial services institution listed on the Australian 
stock exchange and is within the 30 most profitable financial services organisation in the world. In 
January 2004, the bank disclosed to the public that it had identified losses relating to unauthorised 
trading in foreign currency options amounting to AUD360 million. This foreign exchange debacle was 
classified as operational risk, the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed processes, people, or 
systems and reiterated the importance of corporate governance for banks. Concurrent issues of National 
Australia Bank’s AUD4.1 billion loss on US HomeSide loans in 2001, the degree of strength of their risk 
management practices and lack of auditor independence, were raised by the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission in 2004, reinforcing the view that corporate governance had not been given the 
priority it deserved over a number of years. This paper will assess and critically analyse the impact of 
corporate governance failure by management and Board of Directors on NAB’s performance over the 
years 2001-2005.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
ollapse of large companies in Australia over the last decade has led to increasing public and government 
concern over the lack of good management practice and public accountability. Good corporate governance 
structures encourage creation of value, provide accountability and control systems commensurate with the 
risks involved (ASX, 2003) with the Board of Directors being responsible for the corporate governance of their firm. 
They can be best described as the internal auditors that oversee a complex set of relationships among a core group 
consisting of shareholders, board members, regulators and managers. The firm‟s internal governance should create a 
clear and effective structure of accountability with management being held accountable for their company‟s 
performance. Their chief concern should be how to best foster the competitive performance required to achieve the 
corporation‟s primary objective of shareholder wealth maximization. Corporate governance is not just about wealth 
creation it is also about risk management. The National Australia Bank‟s (NAB) forex scandal highlighted an 
operating environment characterised by lax and unquestioning oversight by line management, poor adherence to risk 
management systems and controls and weaknesses in internal governance procedures (APRA 2004). 
 
The National Australia Bank is the largest financial services institution listed on the Australian stock 
exchange and is within the 30 most profitable financial services organisation in the world (NAB Annual Financial 
Report, 2004). In January 2004, the bank disclosed to the public that it had identified losses relating to unauthorised 
trading in foreign currency options amounting to AUD360 million. This foreign exchange debacle was classified as 
operational risk, the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed processes, people, or systems and reiterated the 
importance of corporate governance for banks. The Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA), the Treasury, 
the Certified Practicing Accountant (CPA) society of Australia and other monitoring bodies extensively reviewed this 
financial disaster. The incident accelerated the release of CLERP 9 (Corporate Law Economic Reform Program) of 
the Australian government, which had been fortuitously in the pipeline since 2002. It is of some interest that this 
follows close on the heels of the ENRON collapse in the USA and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. This incident has 
implications for corporate governance not only for the NAB but also for other banks in Australia and internationally. 
C 
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The poor corporate governance and financial woes facing NAB commenced with the HomeSide loan crisis, a write-off 
of AUD4.1 billion of shareholders money in 2001, has continued with issues of auditor independence and rogue 
foreign exchange traders who exploited loopholes in risk management policy, has ensured that  “… the NAB affair 
will be a classic study in crisis management for decades to come…” (Maiden, 2004).   
 
The aim of this paper is to contribute to our understanding of why corporate governance failure occurred in 
the largest and one of the most profitable Australian banks. The impact of corporate governance failure on NAB‟s 
performance is investigated by utilising the DuPont model, whereby accounting-based measures of profitability and 
cost efficiency are used as proxies for performance. The paper is structured as follows: firstly, the paper will outline 
the development in the literature of the history of international corporate governance and its emergence in Australia in 
the 1980s. Secondly, the theoretical and empirical literature of corporate governance and performance are reviewed.  
Following sections investigate and analyse the effects of NAB corporate governance failure on shareholder returns, 
regulatory burden and company performance by examining the financial statements and key profitability and cost 
performance indicators. In the final sections the paper will conclude by examining regulatory and compliance issues 
with some closing remarks identifying areas for future research.  
  
REVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE HISTORY  
 
Gay and Sinnet (2000) define corporate governance as the system by which companies are governed and 
controlled. Whereas, Woodward, Bird and Sievers (2001, 498) define corporate governance as a “catch all phrase used 
to refer to management issues, incorporations and the mechanisms by which corporate management can be supervised 
and made accountable to its members, employees, creditors and the community”.  
 
International Perspective 
 
The history of corporate governance is virtually as old as that of capitalism itself with the first recorded 
dispute in 1622 in the Netherlands, and whilst Adam Smith understood the issues of corporate governance in 1776, he 
did not use the phrase corporate governance (Morck and Steier, 2004) The first recognised academic work on the issue 
of corporate governance was Berle and Means (1932), followed by Coase (1937) as they recognised 
ownership/performance issues arising from the growing separation of power between executive management of major 
public companies and their increasingly remote and diverse shareholders. In more recent times the term “Corporate 
Governance” first surfaced in the 1970s in the USA to describe the role, functions and responsibilities of the board 
and management but did not appear in print until 1983 (Earl, 1983).   
 
The link between corporate governance and principal-agent problems is further highlighted by Farrar (1999) 
who traces the development of corporate governance with the appearance of managerial capitalism and the need to 
raise capital from the public. Farrar‟s view is that in the absence of a countervailing power, management have a 
tendency to pursue their own self-interest at the expense of the corporation. There is a need then to monitor 
management to prevent shirking and other opportunistic behaviour. The corporate governance issues were controlled 
by both fiduciary restraints developed in the common law and supplemented by legislation so that modern directors‟ 
duties are an amalgam of common law, equity and statute. The market for corporate control rewards good 
performance but judges under-performance with either falling share price as investors leave the stock or takeover bids 
occur by more aggressive managers.  
 
The corporate management excesses that occurred from 1960 until the late 1980s led to the beginnings of 
corporate laws reform. Simply out of self-protection, management of leading companies through their interest groups 
and in cooperation with institutional investors began to give serious attention to the development of self-regulation of 
corporate governance. Whilst the spectacular corporate collapses in the USA in 2001 and 2002 put the spot light on 
corporate governance, and particularly the conduct of the directors themselves, corporate governance was high on the 
UK agenda before they occurred. Over the decade of the 1990‟s, the UK had been recognised the world leader on best 
practice of corporate governance leading to a number of reports and codes or guidelines on corporate governance (see 
Table 1). 
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Table 1: Development Of International Corporate Governance 
Author Year Report Comments Or Key Suggestions 
British Accounting 
Standards and Steering 
Committee (UK) 
1975 “The Corporate Report” All economic entities to report publicly and accept 
accountability for the impact of director‟s decisions 
Rhys Williams (UK) 1977 “The Conduct of 
Company Directors” 
Green Paper presented to British Parliament – did not see 
the light of day 
London Stock Exchange 
& Financial Reporting 
Council 
 
The Cadbury Committee 
(UK) 
1992  “The Financial Aspects 
of Corporate 
Governance”  
 
The Cadbury Report 
Boards should have checks and balances to ensure that no 
single individual could have “unfettered powers of 
decision”, should have at least 3 non-executive members of 
which 2 should be fully independent, should have an audit 
committee, and should explain its corporate governance 
procedures. 
Rutterman Committee 
(UK) 
1994 Rutterman Report Internal control and financial reporting 
Greenbury Committee 
(UK) 
1995 “Directors‟ 
Remuneration: the 
report of a study group” 
The Greenbury Report 
Transparency or lack thereof in directors remuneration 
disclosure in the UK 
Hampel Committee (UK) 1995 
 
“Committee on 
Corporate Governance” 
report” 
Reviewed the decisions of the Cadbury committee and 
included more detailed and more rigid prescriptions for 
companies, boards of directors and audit processes. 
California Public 
Employees Retirement 
System (CalPERS) 
1997 and 
revised 
in 1999 
Global Corporate 
Governance 
Good governance needs to be accountable and transparent. 
Business Roundtable (An 
association of the chief 
executives of the top 250 
companies in the USA) 
1997 Statement on Corporate 
governance 
Revised roles of boards committees, the composition of the 
board and the evaluation of governance process. 
The Turnbull Committee 
(UK) 
1998 Turnbull Report Implementing a risk-based approach to systems of internal 
control and meaningful disclosure 
The Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation 
symposium (APEC) 
1998 APEC finance ministers 
report 
Improve corporate governance in the region to assist in 
restoring financial stability and growth the ravaged South 
East Asian Tiger Economies. 
Organization for 
Economic Co-operation 
and Development 
1998 Corporate Governance 
Report: Improving 
Competitiveness  and 
Access to Capital in 
Global Markets 
Protection of shareholders rights, equitable treatment of 
shareholders, the role of stakeholders in corporate 
governance, disclosure and transparency and the 
responsibilities of the board. Integrity of internal control 
structures and accountability, transparency and disclosure 
of board members and executive staff. 
The  Hampel Report 
 (consolidating the 
Cadbury, Greenbury and 
Hampel Reports) UK 
1998 The Combined Code Requires companies to provide disclosure statement on 
their adherence to the principles of good governance 
US Federal Government, 
NYSE 
2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act Required that the CFO and the CEO certify that the verity 
of the financial statements and be personally responsible 
for them 
Coordinating Group on 
Auditing and Accounting 
Issues in the UK (CGAA) 
2003 Final CGAA Report Recommended the formation of an independent group to 
develop the existing guidance on audit committees 
contained in the Combined Code and to clarify the roles of 
audit committees with the backing of the British Financial 
Reporting Council 
 Derek Higgs (UK) 2003 Higgs Report Independent review of the role and effectiveness of non-
executive directors on a board of directors 
European Corporate 
Governance Forum 
2004 “High level Group of 
Experts” Report 
To enhance the convergence of national corporate 
governance codes 
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Australian Perspective  
 
Australia has historically followed the British common law framework and has continued this tradition with 
the British law for corporate governance. This provided the framework for the development of our own corporate 
governance laws and acts in the last two decades. Australia‟s corporate governance evolution has been recent with 
most of its development occurring in the past 4 years, stimulated by the recent worldwide corporate collapses of 
ENRON, WorldCom, Arthur Anderson, Pyramid, and closer to home: Ansett, HIH, and OneTel. The corporate 
collapses occurring in the past five years have all been a reflection of poor management and regulatory practices, and 
whilst NAB has not been a corporate collapse, its management has engaged in poor corporate governance that has 
seen billions of dollars of shareholder funds written off. Table 2 outlines the development of corporate governance in 
Australia. 
 
 
Table 2: Development Of Australia’s Corporate Governance 
Author Year Report Or Act Comments Of Key Suggestions 
Commonwealth 
Government 
1989 Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission Act 
Set out the role of ASIC as a watchdog of corporate 
governance in Australia 
Henry Bosch 1991 “Corporate Practices and 
Conduct” 
Set out the functions of boards of directors, structure, 
function, remuneration, financial reporting and auditing, 
risk and control management 
 The Australian Institute 
of Investment Managers 
(AIMA) 
1995 “Corporate Governance: A 
Guide for Investment 
Managers and a Statement of 
Recommended Corporate 
Practice”. 
Published the standards of conduct  
Commonwealth 
Government  
1997 Corporate Law Economic 
Reform Program (CLERP 1) 
Australian Accounting Standards Board reinstituted 
Commonwealth 
Government  
1998 CLERP 5: Company Law 
Review Act (1998)  
Payments Systems and Netting 
Act (1998) 
Reforms relating to electronic commerce 
Commonwealth 
Government 
2001 Corporations Act 2001 Mandatory Corporate Governance Compliance, covers 
all aspects of company law 
ASX 2002 Corporate Governance 
Council 
Develop recommendations which reflect International 
Best Practices of Corporate Governance 
Charles Report: The Joint 
Parliamentary Committee 
of Public Accounts and 
Audit 
2002 Review of Independent 
Auditing by Registered 
Company Auditors 
Made changes to the Corporations Act 2001 in that 
auditors were to rotate, limit the ability of audit firms to 
do non-audit work, and stricter professional and probity 
requirements for auditors 
The Group of 100 (CFOs 
of the top 100 companies 
in Australia) 
2003 “Guide to review of operations 
and Financial Condition” 
Code of Conduct 
ASX 2003 Principles of Good Corporate 
Governance and  Best Practice 
Recommendations 
Director independence, accountability, transparency and 
disclosure 
ASX 2003 Disclosure Listing Rule 3.1 
and  new rule 18.7A 
Required to provide ASX with evidence of continuous 
disclosure 
CPA 2003 Corporate Governance 
Principles 
Reducing the number of boards on which a Board 
member can be nominated. 
Commonwealth 
Government  
2004 CLERP 9 Accounting standards and board responsibility. 
Commonwealth 
Government  
2005 The International Financial 
reporting Standards 
Increased board accountability. 
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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION 
 
“Corporate governance crisis and reform is cyclical. Waves of corporate governance reform and increased 
regulation occur during periods of recession, corporate collapse and re-examination of the viability of regulatory 
systems. During long periods of expansion, active interest in the conformance aspects of governance diminishes, as 
companies and shareholders become again more concerned with the generation of wealth, rather than ensuring 
government mechanisms are working appropriately for wealth retention…”. Clarke (2004) Market systems are 
volatile, competitive and dynamic. These exert a covert control over company boards, there being a significant 
pressure to perform.  
 
The highly publicised nefarious activities of Australian corporate highfliers, Christopher Skase and Alan 
Bond, in the late 1980s, prompted the then Labour government to begin the process of implementing corporation laws 
in the early 1990s. The change of government in 1995 modified the focus of reform delaying the passage of the 
Second Corporate Law Simplification Bill until 1996. CLERP was commenced as an ongoing review and reform 
process in 1997 to review and reform the country‟s corporate and business regulation.  
 
The Corporate Law Economic Reform Program 9 (CLERP 9) has been the most significant addition to 
corporate governance regulation in Australia drawing on both British and US advances in this area. It also draws on 
the recommendations of the Australian Federal Government‟s September 2003 response to the recommendations 
contained in the Report of the HIH Royal Commission released in April 2003. The major changes in CLERP 9 are the 
incorporation of the recommendation of the Ramsay Report on the independence of Australian company auditors, 
incorporation of the changes to NYSE Listing Rules and the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, consideration of the 
developments in the UK with the release of the Higgs Report on non-executive directors, the Smith report on Audit 
function, the proposed changes to the combined code and the ASX listing rule amendments on enhanced disclosure 
and corporate governance and the establishment of the ASX Corporate Governance Council and the release by this 
council of its principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations in March 2003.   
 
The Australian Prudential and Regulatory Authority (APRA) have used the services of Corporate 
Governance International Pty Ltd since 1994 to provide it with rating and analysis of large regulated financial 
institutions listed on the Australian Stock Exchange. APRA also uses a “PAIRS” risk rating system to assess the 
strengths and weaknesses of boards. (APRA, 2002) 
 
In May 2005, APRA released a discussion paper to introduce new governance requirements for APRA 
regulated institutions. The majority of APRA regulated institutions are not listed on the ASX and therefore not subject 
to the ASX Corporate Governance guidelines. These address the appointment of the chairperson of the board, board 
size and composition, board member resignations, independence of directors and external auditors, establishment of 
board audit and risk committees, board and senior management performance, length of service of directors, 
independence of external auditors and actuaries consistent with CLERP 9, internal audit and Australian operations of 
foreign entities.  
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CORPORATE PERFORMANCE LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
There have been a number of studies that have examined the issues of corporate governance and performance 
exploring issues such as board size, interlocking, and director‟s remuneration.. A smaller body of literature 
investigates links between stock prices and profitability (Karathanasis and Philippus, 1998). The evidence is not clear-
cut but intuitively there would appear to be a positive correlation between good corporate governance practice and 
corporate performance. A good working relationship between the board of directors, management and other 
stakeholders in a given firm would result in increased efficiency, throughput and profits. Analysts and markets would 
view these results favourably with resultant higher stock prices. Conversely, in times of corporate governance crises, 
this relationship would be affected and would be reflected in falling stock prices and other measures of corporate 
performance. 
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Hart (1995) discusses the mechanisms for controlling management, how they came into existence and 
whether they need to be provided by statute. He outlines the “Chicago” argument that the market economy can 
achieve efficient corporate governance without government intervention. Accordingly, the Chicago view argues that 
there is no need for statutory corporate governance rules. Rather, that they will almost certainly be counter-productive 
as they will limit the founder‟s ability to tailor corporate governance to their own individual circumstances. 
 
Heracleous (2001) in a two dimensional study evaluated the implications of CEO/Chair duality and 
insider/outsider board composition and organisational performance found it not to be significant. In the same study he 
states that operationalisation of theoretical concepts has low face validity, and that the study is too narrow by ignoring 
other systemic factors, a problem seen by the author in a number of other papers as well. 
 
Korac-Kakabadse et al (2001) argued that a direct relationship between corporate governance and 
performance did not necessarily follow, as their review of literature did not confirm this. Dalton and Daily (1999) in 
their seminal article suggested that the reliance on one dimension of board roles and attributes does not ensure high 
levels of corporate financial performance, especially if this is at the expense of other director roles. This implies that 
analysis of boards of companies and their workings needs to be multidimensional and not focus on a single variable. 
 
Parker, Peter and Turetsky (2002) investigated the association of various corporate governance attributes and 
financial characteristics in the survival of distressed firms. They found that firms replacing their CEO with an outsider 
were twice as likely to go bankrupt. They also found that large levels of insider ownership were positively associated 
with a good outcome. Good corporate discipline can be a result of reaction to the marketplace or from within due to 
good corporate governance structures and or ownership. 
 
Nicholson and Kiel (2004) describe the functioning of a board as multidimensional and its decision making 
influenced by multiple factors. They formulated a diagnostic framework to analyse where and how boards are going 
wrong.  This model of board effectiveness has four inputs, which provide the specific operating boundaries of the 
board. Adapting Nadler and Tushman‟s (1980) key inputs to the board performance relationship, there are 
organisation type, the company‟s legislative and societal framework, the organisation‟s constitution and lastly, 
company history, which reflect the broader influences of past events. The key past events that impact current 
corporate governance expectations are past performance, corporate culture, values and decisions on board composition 
that will affect how the board functions. Within this last group, board culture, the term used to describe underlying 
values, beliefs and norms of the board has the most significant influence. It is implicit within the firm and governs 
“the way we do things around here”. 
 
An empirical study conducted by Chiang (2005) on corporate governance and transparency in the high-tech 
industries of Taiwan found a significant positive relationship between corporate transparency and operating 
performance. Outside investors can then rely on the information provided by the company to make their decisions. 
They found a positive association between voluntary disclosure of corporate governance information and the ability to 
raise equity capital. Sengupta (1998) suggested that bondholders and underwriters do consider corporate disclosure 
policy when determining the risk premium applicable to interest rates on debt instruments and Collett and Hrasky 
(2005) found that board size was positively correlated with firm value, and that a positive relationship existed between 
the proportion of inside directors and the market based measures of performance. Doucouliagos and Hoque (2005) 
find that corporate governance is an important determinant of Australian bank‟s stock prices. The direct effect on 
share prices operated through willingness to pay a premium or discount for banks that have good/poor corporate 
governance characteristics. 
 
BRIEF HISTORY OF NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK 
 
The company traces its history back to the establishment of The National Bank of Australasia in 1858. 
National Australia Bank Limited is a public limited company incorporated on June 23
rd
, 1893 in Australia, which is 
the company‟s main domicile. The company operates under the requirements of the Banking Act 1959 
(Commonwealth) and Corporations Act 2001. NAB is the largest financial institution (by market capitalisation and 
total assets) listed on the Australian Stock Exchange and is within the 30 most profitable financial service 
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organizations in the world with total assets of more than AUD411 billion. NAB operates in over 10 countries and has 
8.4 million banking customers and 2.3 million wealth management customers. NAB operations exist in the USA, 
Asia, Australia, New Zealand, and the UK and the company enjoys an AA- Standard and Poor‟s rating. 1 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FAILURES OF NAB, 2000-2004 
 
This paper aims to assess the impact on NAB‟s performance of lack of management supervision, poor 
adherence to risk management systems and controls and failed internal governance procedures.  It was recognised and 
acknowledged in the NAB 2004 Annual Report that the corporate governance failure led to the company‟s poor 
results and its reputation being adversely impacted by compliance issues, insufficient accountability and the lack of a 
clear cultural framework.   
 
The concurrent issues of NAB‟s losses on HomeSide in 2001, the degree of strength of their risk 
management practices and its lack of auditor independence were raised as concerns by the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) in 2004 reinforcing the view that corporate governance had not been given the priority 
it deserved over a number of years. The latest incident of corporate governance failure relating to the fraudulent 
currency traders has had significant ramifications on the company in terms of the changed and increased regulatory 
impost, the internal implosion of the Board, with six of the twelve directors and seven executive officers resigning 
during 2004 and the appointment of a new external auditor. Given the magnitude of changes to the company during 
the 2004 year and the significant fall in its share price as the news became more widespread and digested by the 
market, it would be expected that there would be a negative impact on NAB‟s overall profitability and corporate 
performance.  This view is supported by Corporate Monitor who found a portfolio of 36 companies, rated 
questionable for corporate governance, underperformed the market by 26% since June 2001 (Skadia, Corporate 
Monitor)
2
. 
 
HomeSide US Loans 
 
NAB entered the US home loan market with the acquisition of HomeSide Lending Inc in 1997 when the US 
mortgage industry had a large number of players. Following NAB‟s entry into the mortgage market a wave of 
consolidation reduced the industry to a handful of giants that included Washington Mutual, Wells Fargo and Chase 
Manhattan, all having large banking operations to feed their mortgage processing division, whilst NAB had a very 
small retail presence in the US (Mellish, 2001). The HomeSide blunder was a series of mistakes that lead to the 
devaluation of the NAB script on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and at home on the Australian Stock 
Exchange (ASX).  NAB in its own inquiry stated that the reason for this was a simple blunder by NAB executives in 
the calculation of fees received from servicing mortgages during the life of the loan. Initially HomeSide used an 
internal model to determine these fees and to calculate the gross interest rate. As a part of a computer upgrade NAB 
executives moved to a widely used model that used the net interest rate. The models were linked together, however the 
difference between the net and the gross interest rate in the two models was not recognised by NAB for a period of 
two years. This simple mistake cost AUD755 million, in addition, assumptions in the model proved to have been 
wrong, costing another AUD1.4 billion. These, along with badly bungled interest rate hedging, resulted in NAB 
writing-down a further AUD870 million in July 2001. HomeSide was competing with other lenders who had a large 
retail presence in the US whereas after the sale of its US business Michigan National, NAB lost its retail front and was 
further exposed to the vagaries of the Mortgage processing houses. The US market works on predominantly fixed rate 
home loans as opposed to variable interest loans in Australia. As soon as the bank rate falls there is a stampede for 
refinancing of home loans leading to significant changes in market share at each such episode. These episodes 
combined with NAB‟s failure to understand the American home loan market led to total losses which mounted to 
AUD4.1 billion. (Mellish, 2001) 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 https://www.nabmarkets.com/aboutus/aboutus.asp accessed 27 April 2004 
2
 Information was supplied in PPT slides presented to a corporate forum on corporate governance (2003). 
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Foreign Currency Trader Breach 
 
In January 2004 it came to light that unauthorised trading by NAB foreign currency traders (three in 
Melbourne and one in London) resulted in projected losses of AUD360 million. The losses on currency options were 
caused by the traders positioning the NAB‟s foreign currency option portfolio in expectation that the falls in the US 
dollar that occurred in mid-2003 would reverse and volatility stabilise. Rather than close out their positions as the 
market moved against them, the traders chose to conceal their true positions, allowing those positions to deteriorate 
before they were finally discovered and reported to management by junior employees (APRA, 2004).  Frank Cicutto, 
the then CEO, stated that traders at the center of the scandal had exploited weaknesses in the bank‟s internal 
procedures to hide trading losses and protect bonuses. In the Corporate and Institutional Banking Market‟s division 
there were significant gaps in back office monitoring functions, weaknesses in control procedures and an absence of 
appropriate financial controls. The culture within this area tended to suppress bad news rather than be open and 
transparent about problems. It seems that there were warning signals, both inside the Company, from other market 
participants and from on-site risk reviews by the regulators that were not properly acted upon (NAB 2004 Annual 
Report).  
 
Auditor Independence Breach 
 
At the same time that NAB was facing a media barrage on the foreign exchange trader losses in early 2004, it 
came under scrutiny to ascertain whether it failed to comply with the USA Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) requirements of auditor independence.
3
 Where Australian firms are listed on the NYSE or trade American 
Deposit Receipts (ADRs) they come under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2003) which bars audit firms from providing 
certain non-audit services to audit clients and it also precludes staff of audit firms being seconded to clients in either 
employee or management roles, whereas Australian law does not preclude auditors undertaking other functions 
(Oldfield and Cornell (2004). 
 
NAB had seconded staff from KPMG for extended periods over the past three years to help assess the value 
of distressed loans in the Credit Restructuring Unit as well as perform tax and internal audit functions. NAB‟s use of 
KPMG for non-audit work has been substantial and rising, and was more than double the audit fees in 2000 and 2001. 
NAB‟s use of  KPMG for non-audit services in 2003 amounted to AUD6.56 million and AUD10.81million for audit 
services (Oldfield and Cornell, 2004, and NAB 2004 Annual Report).  
 
Joint provision of audit and non-audit services poses a significant problem for auditor independence. Whilst 
there is little clear support for the view that the joint provision of services has compromised auditor independence, it 
does raise the concern as to the appearance of auditor independence (CGAA, 2003).  
 
REVIEW OF NAB’S PERFORMANCE 2001-2004 
 
Given the significant corporate governance issues that NAB experienced over the past four years, it would be 
expected that NAB‟s performance in terms of profitability and cost efficiency would have deteriorated following these 
events.
4
  This section of the paper concentrates on NAB‟s performance over time and utilises the corporate 
governance issues to explain the volatility experienced in its profitability and cost efficiency measures. 
 
Financial performance evaluation of depository institutions is multifaceted, involving ratio analysis, common 
size financial statements, trend analysis and consideration of additional data not always found in published reports. 
Integrated models, such as the Return on Equity model, widely known as the DuPont model, disaggregates return on 
equity into several basic components in order to isolate the sources of a firm‟s profitability. Return of Equity (ROE) is 
decomposed as a function of a bank‟s cost management (as measured by its net profit margin), its revenue 
management (as measured by its asset utilisation), and its financial leverage (as measured by its equity multiplier). 
This provides a diagnostic tool, which assists observers to determine why a bank‟s performance has deteriorated or 
                                                 
3
 NAB  had received a voluntary information request by the SEC to provide information regarding auditor independence. 
4
 It is envisaged that in a further paper NAB‟s performance will also be compared to its peers in the banking sector. 
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improved in comparison to its peers or its own past record  (Hogan et al, 2004, and Gardner, Mills and Cooperman, 
2004). Utilising trend analysis may assist in revealing long-term patterns in profitability and cost efficiency, which 
allows us to evaluate the ADI against its own past performance. The following data in Table 3 comes from NAB 
annual reports (years 2001-2004) and KPMG Financial Institution Performance Surveys (years 2001-2004). 
 
Return on equity (ROE), is the closest an accounting measure comes to revealing how well managers have 
done in maximising share-holder wealth. This ratio has been variable over the five-year period demonstrating large 
falls in the years 2002 and 2004 (see Table 3), reflecting the 2001 HomeSide US loans write-off of AUD4.1 billion of 
shareholder funds and the late 2003-early 2004 foreign currency losses respectively. The financial report from NAB 
Directors in 2004 indicated that a number of significant items caused net profit attributable to members of the 
Company to decrease by 19.7% compared to its 2003 results.  These significant items amounting to AUD800 million, 
included the AUD360 million foreign currency options trading losses, a write-down of impaired application software 
of AUD307 million and a charge to provide for doubtful debts of AUD204 million (NAB Annual Report, 2004). More 
damning for NAB‟s 2004 performance data is that during that year all the majors, except for NAB, achieved a positive 
profit earnings outcome. The average return on equity for the sector
5
  increased from 17.9% to 18.3% during 2004, 
which KPMG considers is still slightly below the industry benchmark of 20%, hence putting further pressure on 
NAB‟s poor performance with ROEs of 11.5% in 2004 and some improvement to 14% in the first half of 2005 
(KPMG Financial Institutions Performance Survey, 2004, 2005). 
 
 
Table 3: Selected Indicators Of Profitability And Efficiency For NAB 2001-2005 6 
Measurement Indicator In (%) 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
(first half) 
Interest Margin *  2.71 2.67 2.53 2.35 2.19 
Net (Profit) Margin  25.91 21.87 47.75 17.63 na 
Asset Utilisation  5.15 4.28 4.06 4.62 na 
Return on Assets*  0.81 0.90 1.02 0.79 0.67 
Leverage (equity) Multiplier times [x]  14.61x 15.41x 14.32x 14.05x na 
Return on Equity  19.51 14.45 27.78 11.46 14.0 
Operating Expenses/ Average Total Assets*  0.90 1.60 1.64 1.68 0.90 
Cost to Income Ratio*  48.5 47.7 48.4 50.8 57.4 
Capital Adequacy Ratio*  10.2 10.2 9.6 9.3 11.7 
Share Price ($)                                      High 
                                                                Low 
35.13 
23.80 
36.78 
30.87 
34.42 
28.36 
32.12 
26.04 
31.927 
28.20 
Source: NAB Annual Reports 2001-2004 and KPMG Financial Institution Performance Surveys, Years 2001-2005 (Company 
figures from NAB, other data from KPMG  indicated by*) 
 
 
Return on Assets (ROA) a measure of efficiency, indicates management‟s ability to use financial and real 
resources to generate net revenue. The return on assets for an ADI is a function of both its cost management, reflected 
by its net profit margin and its revenue management captured by its asset utilisation ratio. The net margin calculated 
by operating income after tax divided by interest income measures the profit margin, that is, what is left out of one 
dollar‟s revenue after all costs have been taken out. NAB‟s data demonstrates some variability in its net profit margin 
particularly reflecting the impact of the losses in 2004 and ongoing cost efficiency issues in 2005. 
                                                 
5
  This sector is made up of the five largest banks that include NAB, Commonwealth Bank of Australia, Australia and New Zealand 
Bank, Westpac and St. George Bank. 
6
 Notes to  table 3: Interest Margin (net interest income/ earning assets), Net (Profit) Margin (operating profit after tax/ interest 
income), Asset Utilisation (interest income/ assets), Return on Assets  (operating profit after tax/assets), Leverage (equity) Multiplier 
(total assets/shareholder equity), Return on Equity (operating profits after tax/ shareholder equity), Operating Expenses/ Average 
Total Assets (operating expenses are total expenses (before tax) less interest expenses, excluding BADD and goodwill amortisation 
expense), Cost to Income Ratio (costs include total expenses, Capital Adequacy Ratio (risk-weighted capital calculated according 
to regulators requirements) 
7  NAB share prices for first half 2005 are recorded with the Low of AUD28.20 at Jan 2005, and the High of AUD31.92 as at May 
30, 2005 (The Australian Financial Review,  (2005) “Market Wrap”, p.37 
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The asset utilisation ratio or yield reflects how effectively management has invested in earning assets by 
calculating the overall yields earned on the assets. NAB‟s asset utilization ratio fell from 5.15% in 2001 to a low of 
4.06% in 2003 with recovery occurring in 2004, whilst its financial leverage ratio remained high at above 14% over 
the four year period. Typically ADIs have relatively low ROAs, but because of their high financial leverage ratio they 
are able to generate reasonably acceptable ROEs, which makes them competitive, as an investment option, with non-
bank firms. 
 
It is not sufficient to use only the DuPont model for evaluating ADI performance. The cost efficiency ratios, 
such as Operating Expenses/Average Total Assets and the Cost to Income ratio are the most complete measures of 
overhead use. The cost to income ratio poses operating costs or overhead as the input to banking activities (the 
numerator) and operating revenue ie. net interest income plus non-interest income, as the output (the denominator) 
being produced by overhead. The smaller the values of these cost efficiency ratios the greater the efficiency (Hogan et 
al, 2004). The efficiency ratios for NAB are of some concern as the cost to income ratio for all other major banks has 
improved steadily over the past three years with the sector average at 49.2% (KPMG 2004). NAB might be the biggest 
bank, but by no means is it the best, lagging the other four majors in most key financial measurements. NAB‟s cost to 
income ratio jumped to 57.4% in the March 2004 half-year report, up from 50.8% at the same time in 2003. The ratio 
is sharply higher than any of its four main rivals, ANZ reported a cost to income ratio of 52.7%, Westpac‟s fell to 
48%, whilst St George bank boasts the lowest cost to income ratio of just 45% (Johnston, 2005).  
 
Good corporate governance practices are increasingly important in determining the cost of capital in a global 
capital market. Australian companies must be equipped to compete globally and to maintain and promote investor 
confidence both in Australia and overseas. McKinsey and Company (2002) discovered in their USA Global Investor 
Opinion Survey on Corporate Governance that good corporate governance affected investor confidence: 
 
 63% investors would avoid companies with poor corporate governance 
 57% would change their holdings 
 31% would avoid investing in countries known for poor governance practice and regulation 
 28% would change their holdings in some countries if their governance practice varied 
 73-78% would pay a premium for a well governed company 
 
This suggests that investors are willing to pay a higher price and to change their shareholdings for companies 
with good corporate governance. This was clearly shown with the sudden 5.5% fall in the NAB share price on the 
NYSE following the announcement of the HomeSide loan debacle in July 2001 (Collections World, 2001).  The 
impact was more dramatic and significant on the ASX with NAB‟s ordinary share price falling by 33% from a high of 
AUD35.13 in July to a low of AUD23.80 by September 2001. As the recent foreign currency scandals came to light 
NAB share price again dramatically fell 19% from a high of AUD32.12 in January 2004 to AUD26.04 by September 
2004, with partial recovery in the share price occurring slowly over many months. A year later and despite the 
revamping of the board, the share price of NAB is still hovering around AUD30.00 and NAB‟s lead position in the 
major bank share prices was given over to CBA shares in mid-2004, a position CBA continues to retain with its shares 
currently trading significantly higher than NAB‟s at AUD37.38 (Commsec, 2005). 
 
REGULATORY AND COMPLIANCE ISSUES 
 
What lessons can be learnt by other banks and regulators? Other Australian banks have watched as the largest 
Australian bank has undergone “public chastisement” in the period immediately following the foreign exchange 
debacle in January 2004. The regulatory response to NABs trading losses was scathing, indicating that its culture had 
impeded transparency and led to poor oversight and weak risk management (Gluyas, 2005). APRA implemented a 
series of  remedial actions that required NAB to comply with a series of 81 actions, imposed on-site supervision until 
the actions were implemented, and raised NAB‟s internal target total capital adequacy ratio8 to 10%, up from the 
Group‟s previous internal capital ratios of 9-9.5%. NAB‟s approval to use an internal model to determine market risk 
capital was withdrawn and the currency option desk closed to corporate business until all areas of concerns in the 
                                                 
8 Australian Banks adhere to the international capital adequacy requirement of a minimum 8% risk-weighted capital. 
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APRA Report were addressed. Risk management strategies that had to be implemented prior to NAB‟s foreign 
currency option desk  re-opening included increased monitoring of all market risk limits with mandatory “hard” limits 
and trigger or “soft limits” which included a defined response. Over a year later, in May 2005, the foreign currency 
option desk reopened after undergoing the significant restructuring as required by the APRA/PwC recommendations.  
NAB has submitted 71 of the 81 required remedial measures (with 31 items completed by March 2005), the bank must 
still comply with the regulator‟s risk model and is required to hold the higher specified capital until APRA is satisfied 
that the weaknesses in the Report have been fully rectified (NAB 2004 Annual Report and APRA 2004). The use of 
the so-called standard model (regulator‟s model) for calculating NAB‟s regulatory capital needs for market risk has 
required the bank to carry about AUD450 million in extra regulatory capital than if allowed to use the more 
sophisticated internal models. Part of NAB‟s 8% increases in its cost to income ratio over 2004-2005 has been 
attributed to the added cost of compliance with APRA requirements (Oldfield, 2005). 
 
This significant NAB corporate governance failure resulted in a review by APRA and Price Waterhouse 
Coopers (PwC). The forensic work done by the accounting firm helped close off gaps in NAB‟s trading system and 
rule off losses relatively quickly. Concerns regarding the independence of this PwC report and the APRA report 
should be  raised as PwC, who were the “external experts” asked by the NAB to audit the scandal, already had a close 
and extensive relationship with the NAB board. The PwC report was commissioned by Cathy Walter and Frank 
Cicutto, both resigned from the board before the report was tabled. Charles Allen the chairman of the board also 
resigned before the report was tabled, compounding the disaster.  Elevating this report to the status of an independent 
report (which is what happened) leaves it open to criticism, and particularly when Walter began rasing concerns about 
it with her fellow directors. The APRA report can also be considered less than ideal as the regulator established a 
small team who then utilised the factual information provided by the PwC investigative committee appointed by NAB 
board directors and the CEO (Maiden, 2004). 
 
There is no single model of corporate governance and the ASX Corporate Governance Council provides ten 
core principles with implementation guidance in the form of best practice recommendations. There is significant 
flexibility as the Council recognizes that there is no one size fits all in relation to corporate governance and the 
extreme diversity in company type and size. Companies can assess and make their own decisions regarding their 
governance structures within the recommendations and suggestions from the Council‟s guidelines. But it is subject to 
disclosure on an “if not, why not?” basis, which means that a company need not implement or adopt the 
recommendations, but there is the requirement to explain why not (ASX 2003).  
 
Under the ASX Company Listing Rules, 2004 was the first year that listed trusts and companies were 
required to provide disclosure against the ASX Corporate Governance Council's Principle‟s of Good Corporate 
Governance and Best Practice Recommendations in their annual report. The burden of meeting these formal 
requirements should not be underestimated as it requires significantly more reporting and the risk structures and 
internal controls must at least be alluded to, be in the process of implementing or have been implemented. The 
Council‟s recommendations are not mandatory and cannot, in themselves, prevent corporate failure or mistakes in 
corporate decision-making, but they can provide a reference point for enhanced structures to minimize problems and 
optimize performance and accountability (ASX, 2003). The extent of the reporting burden can be seen in the 
significant increase in the attention committed to corporate governance issues in the NAB annual reports over the past 
four years. Corporate governance issues in NAB annual reports have increased more than threefold from three pages 
in 2001 to ten pages in the 2004 annual report. 
 
Whilst NAB has complied with the letter of the law in terms of compliance with the ASX Principle‟s of 
Good Corporate Governance, it seems that the spirit was missing. The risk committee was formed in August 2003 but 
there were no meetings held during 2003, interestingly enough this was at the very time that risk systems were being 
breached at NAB and was soon to blow up into the foreign currency scandal  (NAB Annual Report 2003). It was 
further admitted by John Stewart, the new CEO, in an interview with Michael Pascoe (2004) that there were no non-
executive members on the risk committee with any banking experience. The chairman and then CEO were part of this 
Committee and with direct lines of accountability and responsibility; it was only going to be a matter of time before 
they both would need to step aside from their positions. Mr Graham Kraehe, chairman of this risk committee, took 
over the role of Board Chairman after Mr Charles Allen stepped down following the breaking of the news in the 
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media. It seemed inappropriate that the board member presiding over the risk committee, which had failed in its basic 
requirement to manage risk practices, should take over the chairman position. The Board lurched about uncertainly for 
2-3 months as claim and counter-claim and motions of no-confidence were lodged at Board Members. The Board 
geared up for a general meeting of shareholders to resolve the issues of board membership in May 2004 but the 
meeting failed to go ahead as finally deals were struck for some members of the board to step down immediately with 
others resigning according to a phased-in time-table, avoiding, by the narrowest of margins, the public blood-letting. 
These issues relating to the risk committee were addressed during 2004 when all new members, having appropriate 
experience, were appointed to the mandatory risk committee changing its public and private face substantially. The 
committee met 18 times during 2004, in direct contrast to the previous year when no meetings were held (NAB 2004 
Annual Report). 
 
In regards to regulation in an international context the “principle versus the detailed rules” debate has been 
closely followed with the USA and Australia adopting a method in 2003, which provides flexibility and not the “one-
size-fits-all” approach that occurs with regulation. Policy implications from Hart‟s (1995) analysis support this view 
as he finds that the use for statutory rules is weak; rather the Cadbury (UK) approach of trying to educate companies 
to make changes in corporate governance is probably superior. Rules are no substitute for market mechanisms, such as 
the takeover mechanism, that exists and ensures that companies are well managed.  
 
The debate of rules versus principles continues, but the ASX has come down in favour of mainly principles 
with some mandatory requirements.  Regulation of auditors is not sufficient to address problems of auditor 
independence. It needs to be complemented by the strengthening of the role of the audit committee. The GCAA 
(2003) is not as strict as the SEC and does not advocate a total ban on provision of all non-audit services by auditors 
of the company, as there are good business reasons of efficiency and synergy to purchase non-audit services, such as 
tax planning, tax advice and tax compliance, subject to audit committee pre-approval. An exception to the disclosure 
requirement of “if not, why not?” applies regarding audit committees for companies comprising the Australian 
S&P/ASX All Ordinaries Index. The ASX Listing Rules mandate the establishment of audit committees by those 
companies and require that the composition, operation and responsibility of the audit committee comply with the 
Council‟s best practice recommendations. It was expected that these companies would have an internal audit 
committee formed by the first day of their 2004 financial year, but the ASX have allowed transitional arrangements 
until June 2005 (ASX, 2005). 
 
Further Regulatory Reform 
 
Risk management may need further legislation, such as the new prudential standards on business continuity 
management (BCM) for authorised deposit-taking institutions (ADIs) and general insurers issued by APRA in May 
2005. These new prudential standards aim to ensure that ADIs and general insurers implement a “whole of business” 
approach to BCM appropriate to the nature and scale of their individual operations. It will require the Board of 
Directors and senior management of an ADI or general insurer to consider business continuity risks and controls as 
part of the company‟s overall risk management framework provided to APRA on an annual basis. Further resources 
will be required in the risk assessment area and prudential supervisors may well require ADIs to hold more capital and 
increase the level of public disclosure in line with the ASX‟s principles of good governance. 
 
A number of issues arise in regards to auditor independence. Firstly, auditor capture may occur, where the 
auditor has too close an identification with the firm and its management, even where this may be contrary to 
shareholder interests. Secondly, the audit firm may be concerned about losing major clients to be objective in their 
reporting, and thirdly, the effective control of auditor appointment and remuneration may be controlled by the 
executive directors. The enforcement of independence of internal and external auditors already occurs in the US, but is 
unlikely to become a requirement in the UK or Australia, as their Corporate Governance Councils hold strong views 
on enhancing the role of the audit committee via the „comply and explain‟ approach over the legislative approach. 
(CGAA, 2003).  The question that needs to be asked is whether it is possible to have independent auditors and other 
financial services from the big four accounting firms.  To avoid the possibility of auditor capture, mandatory rotation 
of auditors is suggested, but the US experience suggests problems with mandatory rotation of auditors. Laxness may 
occur as the auditing firm knows it is not keeping the client; there is reduced need to prove performance as it is just a 
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„matter of waiting your turn‟ until your rotation, along with declining numbers of the large audit houses and industry 
rationalisation over the years it would be difficult to implement successfully. Although this problem could be reduced 
if compulsory tendering was implemented with the incumbent audit firm disallowed from re-tendering. 
 
There would seem to be a need for increased and more effective monitoring by the regulator and the question 
should be asked whether APRA played a proactive enough role. There was considerable laxness in APRA‟s oversight 
of NAB with failure to act promptly to warning signals (NAB 2004 Annual Report). APRA‟s reliance on the PwC 
investigation into the foreign currency losses also seems inappropriate. To avoid potential conflicts of interest the 
regulator needs to have sufficient resources to run its own independent audit committee/ investigative committee 
rather than relying on one of the big four accounting firms to undertake the factual part of the review, as happened in 
the NAB review. Mandatory „arm‟s length‟ investigation and more powers to be granted by legislation to the 
regulatory body may mitigate some of these concerns. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
A review of the NAB‟s recent corporate governance failures suggest that problems existed in the culture, the 
controls and the management of risk in this organisation for some years. Cornell (2005) states that Stewart (CEO) is 
not just unwinding the past five years of mismanagement under Cicutto, but he is also unwinding the disasters from 
the preceding CEO. The lack of accountability by the management and the Board seems to have stemmed from at 
least the HomeSide incident if not before.  Maiden‟s (2004) view is that seeds were sown in 2001 when no director or 
board member took responsibility or the „fall‟ for the AUD4.1 billion losses that occurred. Management and the Board 
provided shareholders with only a summary of an internal report into how the money was lost.  The 2004 foreign 
currency losses pale into insignificance beside the HomeSide losses, and again the Board escaped reasonably lightly 
from the inquiry with the PwC and APRA reports focusing on management mistakes and structural flaws in the risk 
oversight system. The disastrous events that unfolded concerning the Board came more from the failure to defuse 
disagreement between Board members before it became a public war.   
 
The DuPont analysis allowed a comparison of NAB‟s performance in terms of profitability and cost 
efficiency.  The net (profit) margin and ROE showed distinct variance in the years following both the Homeside and 
foreign currency losses and the cost to income ratio, a measure of efficiency, slipped to 57.4% from 50.8% a year 
earlier. The significance of this increase in costs is in the comparison with NAB‟s peers where the average for the 
sector was 49.2% (KPMG 2004). The share price on the ASX experienced significant falls in the year of each of the 
events, and a year later is trading at more than AUD7.00 below the CBA, its strongest competitor.  The view of 
market commentators and John Stewart, CEO, is that the bank has now hit „the bottom‟ and after stabilising, can begin 
recovery with plans to cut 4,200 jobs as a means of controlling the cost-income ratio (Cornell, 2005).  
 
The events that occurred provided the stimulus for significant changes to the legislation and the principles 
concerning corporate governance but with all rules and regulations it is necessary to balance the public interest of 
imposing rules and providing strong guidelines.  The current environment for corporate governance in many countries 
can be described as co-regulatory, where there is a mix of principles and mandatory requirements. There are strong 
incentives to continue this stance worldwide as increasing globalization of capital markets sees a growing recognition 
and desire to achieve uniformity and harmonization in areas of auditing and good principles of corporate governance. 
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